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Abstract
We empirically investigate the e⁄ect of reference point violations
on job satisfaction and performance of managerial employees in a large
company in Germany and the United States.
We ￿nd evidence in line with loss aversion and inequality aversion.
While negative deviations from a reference point induced by the system
have signi￿cant detrimental e⁄ects on satisfaction, the impact of pos-
itive deviations is nil. Furthermore, violations of managers· reference
points a⁄ect performance negatively.
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11 Introduction
Relative positions of employees a⁄ect wage structures in ￿rms. In an often-
cited survey study of more than 300 US companies, Bewley (1999) concludes
that ￿within a company, pay inequity o⁄ends (indeed, sometimes outrages)
employees and destroys trust￿ . There is evidence that employees not only
orientate on absolute wages for their evaluations of payments but also on
relative standings.
The importance of relative comparisons is well established in happiness
research: Subjective well-being and reported life satisfaction are highly re-
lated to relative wealth positions (for economic applications of these phe-
nomena see Frank & Sunstein (2000) and Clark et al. (2007)). There is also
a growing empirical and experimental literature suggesting an impact of rel-
ative comparisons on satisfaction and (real or experimental) performance of
subjects in labor market environments (see Pfe⁄er & Langton (1993), Brown
et al. (2008) and Torgler et al. (2008) for empirical studies and Greenberg
(1988) and Clark et al. (2006) for experiments). Generally, these studies doc-
ument detrimental e⁄ects of wage/payout dispersion or status inequalities
that are usually driven by negative reactions of persons in inferior positions.
In economic models, the impact of relative positions have been incorpo-
rated in various ways. Akerlof & Yellen (1990) proposed a negative rela-
tionship between a worker￿ s e⁄ort and her wage relative to a visualized ￿ fair￿
wage. If realized wages are lower than the wages perceived as fair, e⁄ort
exertion of employees is undermined. Moreover, the existence of positional
concerns among workers, i.e. the dependency of utility on one￿ s rank in
a reference population, may lead to wage compression in ￿rms (see Frank
(1984a), Frank (1984b)).
The importance of relative payo⁄s in a labor market environment can
be motivated also by theories of inequality aversion (Bolton & Ockenfels
(2000) and Fehr & Schmidt (1999)). These models assume that utility or
motivation does not depend solely on absolute payo⁄s of a person, but also
on her payo⁄standing relative to a social reference point or to other persons.
Finally, loss aversion plays a role in this context. The concept of loss
aversion postulates that utility is evaluated relative to a reference point.
Losses, i.e. negative deviations from a given reference point, decrease utility
stronger than same-sized positive deviations increase utility (see Kahne-
2man & Tversky (1979), Tversky & Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman et al.
(1991)).
The identi￿cation of the impact of loss aversion in labor market en-
vironments is, however, di¢ cult. For given incentive schemes, there are
multiple reference points that could possibly in￿ uence employees. For this
reason, related theoretical and empirical evidence is scarce. K￿szegi & Rabin
(2006) proposed a model of reference-dependent preferences in which refer-
ence points are formed on the basis of rational expectations and apply this
concept among other things to labor supply decisions. In an empirical study,
Mas (2006) showed that police performance in the US was sensitive to pay
rises compared to reference points set by ￿nal o⁄er arbitrations. If arbitra-
tors in a compensation dispute decided in a way unfavorable to the demand
of the police force, the number of crimes cleared decreased afterwards.
There is a large literature on the optimal design of incentive schemes
(see Prendergast (1999) for a survey of incentive theories). Empirical studies
show a generally positive impact of variable pay on performance (see Lazear
(2000) and Bandiera et al. (2007)). However, variable payment schemes
may not provide optimal incentives if agents have social preferences. Sliwka
(2007) introduced a model in which ￿xed rather than variable wages chosen
by the principal send a positive signal about her trust in a cooperative social
norm and may induce higher e⁄ort exertion. For a literature overview about
the impact of social preferences on di⁄erent incentive schemes see Englmaier
(2005).
To our knowledge, there is no study investigating the impact of reference
points for incentive schemes. In business practise, substantial importance is
attached to the design of variable pay systems. However, we are not aware
of an empirical test about the importance of reference points for the success
of these systems.
We analyze the impact of reference points both on job satisfaction and
performance with the example of a typical bonus system for executives of
a world-wide operating company. The connection of survey, compensation
and performance data on the individual level enables us to assess incentive
and satisfaction e⁄ects of given system features and their implementation
in practice. Moreover, the implemented system has the advantage that it
provides a clear reference point against which managers can evaluate their
bonus payments.
3We ￿nd that - in line with loss aversion and inequality aversion - nega-
tive deviations from the reference point have signi￿cant detrimental e⁄ects
on reported job satisfaction while the impact of positive markups is nil.
Furthermore, lack of transparency mitigates the importance of reference
points, and spot bonuses have a stronger e⁄ect on satisfaction than regular
bonus payments even though their economic relevance for employees is much
smaller. With respect to performance, we ￿nd that violations of managers·
reference points a⁄ect their supervisor performance negatively. The neg-
ative e⁄ect is robust against alternative speci￿cations of reference points,
evaluation behavior and team composition. Section 2 describes the survey
and the compensation data; section 3 presents the results for reported job
satisfaction and performance. In section 4, we provide a brief discussion of
our results and conclude.
2 The Data
2.1 Survey, Compensation and Performance Data
We study if social preferences and reference points a⁄ect employees· percep-
tions of payment systems. These questions are adressed using survey and
compensation data from managers of a multinational company (>100,000
employees) operating in diverse business ￿elds. In cooperation with the
company, we conducted a survey among managers located in Germany (au-
tumn 2007) and the United States (summer 2008). The large majority of
managers of the company are subject to the same system of variable com-
pensation (the main exception being sales-related positions). However, the
handling of the system di⁄ers in small but important details that are de-
cisive for the formation of reference points and incentives induced by the
system.
As the survey was part of a larger study, managerial employees were
asked some 60 questions about job satisfaction and motivation, workplace
characteristics, and preferences for incentive schemes. Together with the
survey, we collected personal data about demographic characteristics, de-
partment a¢ liations, performance evaluation and compensation over the
years 2004-2006 (Germany) and 2004-2007 (US). The technical environment
allowed us to connect the background data with survey answers in a way
that guaranteed anonymity of the participants. Altogether 4,997 executives
4took part in the survey (3,122 in Germany and 1,875 in the US).1
Contrary to measures of satisfaction and motivation directly derived
from the survey, objective performance measures are not available due to
diversity of tasks between and within company divisions. Moreover, in some
cases the characteristics of the task itself makes an objective evaluation di¢ -
cult (for example for managers in the research department). For this reason,
we rely on subjective performance evaluation measures for our analysis of
incentives.
2.2 Characteristics of the Bonus System
At the end of every business year, individual bonus budgets are determined
by linking company performance, hierarchy level and ￿xed salary of a man-
ager. Each supervisor receives the sum of individual bonus budgets to dis-
tribute among the managers in her department. Then, she allocates personal
payout percentages (markups on or reduction below 100% bonus budget).
This decision depends on the individual performance evaluation of a per-
son. The system de￿nes payout percentage intervals for each of ￿ve possible
performance ratings (including ￿ Excellent￿ , ￿ Above Average￿ , ￿ Average￿ ,
￿ Below Average￿and ￿ Inadequate￿ ). For example, a person rated ￿ Average￿
(the majority of managers) should be assigned between 80% - 110% of her
individual bonus budget. If a supervisor evaluates all her managers with
￿ Average￿ratings, she is able to allocate every person the actual budget of
100%. However, the interrelation between performance ratings and payout
percentages makes bonus assignments a zero-sum game. If a supervisor dif-
ferentiates in ratings, externalities are created by the budget: If one manager
receives a bonus payment >100% of her budget, another manager must nec-
essarily receive a bonus <100%. Moreover, the variety of hierachical levels
expands the budgeting pressure for the supervisors.
Bonus payments of German and US managers are roughly comparable
during the period of analysis. Average bonus payments of German managers
account for some some 21,800 USD in 2006 while US managers received
1In the remainder of the paper, we use only data sets for which it was possible to
connect survey answers with demographic and compensation data. For a substantial
share of managers this connection was not feasible, for example due to gaps in the data
or due to the fact that a person has entered a manager level only recently.
5Table 1: Distribution of Performance Ratings
D 2006 US 2007 Recommended
￿ Excellent￿ 0.6 2.0 ￿ 5%
￿ Above Average￿ 22.4 33.9 ￿ 25%
￿ Average￿ 74.1 62.7 ￿ 60%
￿ Below Average￿ 2.8 1.4 ￿ 10%*
￿ Inadequate￿ 0.1 n/a
*Recommended proportion refers to the combined share of ￿ Below Average· and ￿ Inade-
quate· managers.
some 22,500 USD in 2007 (the years relevant for the survey). Furthermore,
average payouts remain largely constant over the years in the sample.2
Given the connection between ratings and bonuses, an important aspect
is the practice of performance evaluation. Table 1 lists the proportions of
performance ratings in the year of our survey. The actual shares of perfor-
mance ratings are contrasted to the recommended distribution provided by
the company.3
We ￿nd ratings biases often discussed in the literature of subjective per-
formance evaluation. Leniency biases (the tendency to rate employees too
positive) and centrality biases (compression of ratings) are well established
empirical phenomena (see Prendergast (1999) for a survey of related stud-
ies).4 In Germany, di⁄erentiation of ratings is less pronounced than desired
by the company, as the large majority of managers receives the medium
rating ￿ Average￿ . There is only a very small share of extraordinary ratings
or grades below average (in sum less than 5%). Supervisors in the US on
average do not di⁄erentiate strongly either. Yet their evaluation behavior is
di⁄erent: In general, American supervisors assign the highest performance
ratings more often whereas there are less cases of lower-than-average ratings.
Furthermore, there is the tendiency towards a leniency bias, as the share of
￿ Above Average￿ratings is substantially higher than recommended.5
2It is important, however, that there is a substantial spread of bonus payments between
managers on di⁄erent hierarchy levels.
3Please note that the recommended distribution has the character of a decision support
for supervisors and is not a forced distribution.
4There is also evidence suggesting that supervisor evaluation biases also in￿ uence sub-
ordinates￿subsequent performance (see the recent study by Bol (2008)).
5The leniency bias could be partly explained by di⁄erent interpretations of the ratings
in the countries. In interviews with responsible supervisors in the US it was stated that
6Figure 1: Percent Shares of Average Bonus Payout Percentages (Regular
Bonus)
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The combination of company success, individual performance evaluation
and budget allocation ￿nally leads to bonus payouts. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of realized bonus payouts in Germany and the US. Although the
bonus system enables supervisors to di⁄erentiate strongly between employ-
ees (theoretically it is possible to assign between 0% and 160% of the bonus
budget), realized payouts are strongly compressed. The large majority of
payout percentages lies around 100% of the budget. While the distributions
are in general similar in Germany and the US, an important di⁄erence is
that US supervisors are more likely to assign more distinct payout percent-
ages (less than 80% and more than 120% of the budget). Generally, the
distribution re￿ ects evaluation patterns in Germany and the US (remem-
ber that each performance rating is associated with an interval of payout
percentages).
Several percentage values serve obviously as focal points for bonus allo-
cation, the most prominent being 100% of the bonus budget.6 In Germany,
nearly 20% of all managerial employees are paid out exactly their budgets.
This focal point is far less decisive in the US, however.
the rating ￿ Below Average￿was associated with more severe implications for the further
career of the respective managers than in Germany. Thus, US supervisor might be more
likely to refrain from assigning this rating.
6A further strong focal point in Germany is 110%, the lower threshold for managers
rated ￿ Above Average￿ .
7A fundamental aspect for our analysis is that the mode of communica-
tion of the bonus paments di⁄ers across countries in a way that enables us
to assess the economic impact of reference points. In Germany, managers
receive information highlighting their personal payout percentages together
with the notice about their yearly bonus payment. Contrary, when US
managers receive the notice about their bonuses, only absolute amounts are
communicated.7 This di⁄erence will have large impacts on the managers￿
perception and incentive e⁄ects induced by the system, as will be shown in
the remainder of the paper.
Finally, in addition to regular bonus payments, supervisors can allo-
cate individual spot bonuses to employees, among other things for special
acheivements or exceptional performance in particular projects. However,
there exist no formal allocation rules, and the practice of spot bonus allo-
cations di⁄ers strongly between supervisors. In most cases, less than 20%
of the managers per supervisor receive spot bonuses. Compared to regular
bonus payments, the economic relevance of these payments is low: The sum
of spot bonuses accounts for some 3% of total bonus payments; on average
spot bonuses of managers who are assigned a payment account for 1.5 - 2.5
% of their yearly incomes.
3 Results
In the discussion of our results, we will ￿rst concentrate on the determinants
of individual job satisfaction. The assessment of the e⁄ects of reference point
violation will be in focus. For this purpose we use cross-section regression
models, in which we investigate the impact of individual compensation and
performance parameters.
Next, a crucial question is whether reference points also a⁄ect incentives
for performance. Using personal data from 2004-2006 (Germany) and from
2004-2007 (US), supervisor performance ratings are our proxies for perfor-
mance. Due to the panel structure of our data set, we are able to track
a supervisor￿ s evaluation behavior in a given year and the evolution of her
performance in the subsequent year over 2(3) years in our sample.
7Please note that US managers are in general able to infer individual payout percent-
ages. However, the connection between actual bonus payment and payout percentage is
not explicitly communicated and emphasized so strongly as in Germany.
83.1 Reference Points and Job Satisfaction
Our proxy variable for job satisfaction is the answer to the question: ￿ I am
very satis￿ed with my job.￿Subjects could respond on a scale from 1 (totally
disagree) to 7 (fully agree), so that increasing values of the score re￿ ect
higher satisfaction. The distributions of answers in the US and Germany
are similar as table 2 shows.
Table 2: Proportions of answers to the question "I am very satis￿ed with
my job." in %
D 2006 US 2007
1 - totally disagree 1.0 1.1
2 3.0 3.9
3 6.0 6.6
4 10.2 13.9
5 27.9 27.5
6 40.0 34.4
7 - fully agree 11.9 12.7
To analyze the impact of compensation instruments on individual job
satisfaction, we estimate regression models with job satisfaction as the de-
pendent variable. In line with Freeman (1978), we use a unit normal trans-
formation of the satisfaction score by subtracting the sample mean from
a person￿ s score and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the
sample.
In the ￿rst step, we investigate the impact of compensation instruments
on reported satisfaction in the year of the survey. We calculate models of
the form
JobSatisfactionit = ￿ + ￿ ￿ Xit + "it
where Xit is the matrix of compensation, performance evaluation vari-
ables as well as controls for demographics, organizational backgrounds and
supervisor evaluation behavior. To account for the discrete outcomes of the
dependent variable, we calculate ordered probit models on the cross-section
of employee data in the year 2006 (Germany) and 2007 (US), respectively.
Table 3 lists alternative speci￿cations for the satisfaction models. The
￿rst important thing to notice is that - controlling for the speci￿c back-
ground of a manager - there is no correlation between salary variables and
9reported satisfaction (model 1 for D and US). In neither country we ￿nd a
signi￿cant impact of the absolute salary or the salary increase in the pre-
ceding year. Furthermore, - despite their substantial economic relevance -
absolute bonus payouts have no signi￿cant in￿ uence either. The respective
coe¢ cients even have negative signs. This latter ￿nding supports the argu-
ment that monetary short-term incentives on their own are not fully suited
to induce motivation and increase job satisfaction among employees.
By contrast, the perfomance rating signi￿cantly and robustly in￿ uence
reported satisfaction of a person. In speci￿cation 1, we include dummy
variables for the performance ratings with ￿ Average￿as the reference group.
For both countries, regression coe¢ cients have the expected signs: Better-
than-average ratings are positively associated with satisfaction while the
opposite is true for lower-than average ratings.8 This ￿nding is robust to
alternative speci￿cations and indicates the decisive impact of performance
evaluation for reported satisfaction. A possible reason suggested by the data
is that evaluation ratings not only in￿ uence short-term bonus payouts but
also long term career opportunities.9
Finally, although absolute amounts are much lower than regular bonus
payments, spot bonuses are signi￿cantly associated with a higher satisfaction
score in case of Germany. This is in line with the results of Engellandt &
Riphahn (2004) indicating a positive relation between surprise bonuses and
proxies for employee e⁄ort. In the US, the coe¢ cient of spot bonuses is also
positive but insigni￿cant.
In the next step, we focus on the role of payout percentages and the
threshold of 100% budget. As external factors such as company success
and hierarchy levels strongly a⁄ect absolute bonus amounts, we expect the
perceived in￿ uence of the individual to be low. Therefore, in speci￿cation
2 we include payout percentages instead of absolute amounts. Indeed, we
￿nd payout percentages to be positively and signi￿cantly correlated with
reported satisfaction. The more a supervisor assigns a manager from her
individual budget, the higher is the satisfaction score.
However, following the literature about the e⁄ect of reference point vio-
8The missing signi￿cance of ￿ Excellent￿and ￿ Inadequate￿ratings in Germany is prob-
abaly related to the small numbers of managers in the sample who were assigned these
ratings.
9Generally we ￿nd a positive correlations between personal performance ratings and
the probability of promotions to higher hierarchy levels in several regression speci￿cations.
10Table 3: Determinants of Job Satisfaction (Dependent Variable: Adjusted
Satisfaction Level)
Country D D D US US US
No. 1 2 3 1 2 3
Model Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Salary (000s) 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Salary Increase (000s) 0.007 0.005 0.006 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.041* 0.042** 0.043** 0.023 0.031 0.031
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Performance Rating 0.405 0.667**
￿ Excellent￿ [0.281] [0.263]
Performance Rating 0.235*** 0.248***
￿ Above Average￿ [0.067] [0.083]
Performance Rating -0.920*** -1.462***
￿ Below Average￿ [0.168] [0.364]
Performance Rating -0.616
￿ Inadequate￿ [0.763]
Absolute Bonus Payout (000s) -0.006 -0.004
[0.010] [0.006]
Bonus Payout Percentage 0.012*** 0.007**
[0.002] [0.003]
Positive Deviation from Bonus 0.003 0.006
Budget (=100%) [0.004] [0.005]
Negative Deviation from Bonus -0.023*** -0.008*
Budget (=100%) [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 2093 2098 2098 917 918 918
log-likelihood -3175 -3192 -3186 -1403 -1416 -1416
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance on the 10%, 5%
and 1%-level, respectively. Demographic Control Variables include a manager￿ s age and
gender, total years of a¢ liation to the company and at a given hierarchy level as well as
dummies for company divisions, hierarchy levels and promotions in the last year.
Control Variables of supervisor evaluation behavior include coe¢ cients of variation of
performance ratings and bonus payout percentages.
11lations, we suspect that the relation of payout percentages and satisfaction
is non-linear. Here, we exploit the fact that the system provides the clear
reference point of 100% bonus budget for each individual. In model 3, we
split payout percentages into those above and those below 100% bonus bud-
get and measure deviations of the actual payout from the threshold. This
model is de￿ned as
JobSatisfactionit =
￿ + ￿ ￿ Xit + ￿ ￿ (STI%it ￿ 100%) ￿ IfSTI%it￿100%g+
￿ ￿ (100 ￿ STI%it) ￿ IfSTI%it<100%g + "it
where IfSTI%it￿100%gand IfSTI%it<100%g are dummy variables taking the
value of 1 if the STI percentage is larger than/equal to 100% or below
100%, respectively. If reference points in￿ uence satisfaction in our sample,
we expect ￿ and ￿ to be di⁄erent from each other. In particular, loss aversion
would imply that j ￿ j<j ￿ j.
Our models con￿rm patterns of reference point sensitivity in the case
of Germany. Markups on 100% do not increase self-reported satisfaction
signi￿cantly. The coe¢ cient is positive but very small. Contrary, decreases
below 100% have a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on satisfaction levels: the
farther away a person￿ s payout percentage is from the 100% threshold, the
lower is her estimated job satisfaction.
On ￿rst sight, the model for US managers provides similar evidence.
Here, we ￿nd also a (weakly) signi￿cant e⁄ect of negative deviations from
100%, and no e⁄ect if the manager receives more than her budget.
However, given the strong correlation between performance evaluation
and payout percentages, we have to rule out the possibility that the pre-
sumed reference point e⁄ect is not in fact driven by ratings. We control
for this possibility by rerunning model 3 but include only managers whose
payout percentages are located around the reference point (those with an
￿ Average￿rating, see table 5 in the appendix). In the case of Germany,
the reference point e⁄ect remains robust and highly signi￿cant. For the
US, however, the signi￿cance of the negative deviation variable diminishes.
Hence, reference point sensitivity is only found among German managers.
Given the di⁄erent levels of transparency with respect to payout percent-
ages, this result is plausible. As in Germany the personal bonus budget
is an open and prominent reference point, its violation is also re￿ ected in
12individual satisfaction. Contrary, US managers do not orientate on their
personal budgets, and negative deviations from the personal budget do not
lower their satisfaction accordingly.
To con￿rm and to quantify this result, we calculate an additional OLS
model with adjusted satisfaction as the dependent variable (table 6 in the
appendix). Instead of payout percentage values we include dummies for per-
centage intervals. The reference group consists of managers who received
payout percentages ￿ 100% and < 105%. For German managers, dummies
below 100% have negative signs and are signi￿cant in most cases, indicating
a lower satisfaction score compared to managers around the threshold (the
exception is the dummy for payouts larger than 95% where the coe¢ cient is
roughly zero). Moreover, the size of the coe¢ cients tend to become larger
the farther away the payout is from the reference point. Dummies on the
positive side of the reference point exhibit positive and insigni￿cant signs.
Corresponding to the low importance of the reference point in the US, there
is no clear tendency found in the model, and all payout dummies are insignif-
icant. The estimated e⁄ects from the model are depicted in ￿gure 2. In the
case of Germany, the coe¢ cients of the interval dummies exhibit roughly
the kinked shape around the reference point implied by loss aversion. For
the US sample, there is no clear relation found between percentage interval
and job satisfaction.
All in all, our results have shown that if the system handling creates a
reference point (here by the mode of communication), it in￿ uences satisfac-
tion in the asymmetric way loss aversion suggests: Positive deviations from
100% are associated with small and insigni￿cant increases of satisfaction.
Contrary, negative deviations from 100% lead to satisfaction decreases that
tend to become stronger, the further a manager moves away from 100%.
Given this e⁄ect, the next question is whether reference point violation also
translate into economic behavior, in our case the performance of the man-
agers.
3.2 Reference Points and Performance
So far, we cannot assess the impact of evaluation practise and bonus as-
signments on actual employee performance. Monetary incentive systems are
implemented to induce e⁄ort exertion, and it is per se not clear if employee
satisfaction and e⁄ort are correlated. To address the issue of incentive ef-
13Figure 2: Estimated E⁄ects of Payout Percentages on Reported Satisfaction
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The ￿gure shows the estimated e⁄ect of payout percentage intervals on job satisfaction,
controlling for compensation, performance rating, and demographic background of the
managers (see model 5 in the appendix). Managers with payout percentages equal or
larger than 100% and smaller than 105% are the reference group.
fects, we rely on proxy measures, because direct controls are not available for
the present company. We assume that a supervisor·s rating in a given year -
irrespective of her function - is positively correlated with the e⁄ort provided
by her subordinates. Thus, performance ratings of the supervisors are our
measures for the performance of the respective teams. We further assume
that evaluation behavior of a supervisor in a given year a⁄ects motivation
(and subsequently performance) of the team members in the following year.
This corresponds to the following model with a supervisor ￿ s performance
in year t + 1 as the dependent variable
Ratingit+1 = ￿ + ￿ ￿ DevRefit + ￿ ￿ Xit + "it
where Xit is a vector of individual background variables of a supervi-
sor in the previous year t as well as a year dummy. As in the case of the
satisfaction variable, we use a unit normal transformation of the perfor-
14mance rating. Besides organizational a¢ liations and hierarchy levels, the
background variables include compensation data (￿xed salary and salary in-
crease) and evaluation behavior in year t. For the latter, we use the shares
of employees rated ·Excellent·, ·Above Average· and ·Below Average·.10
It is important to note that evaluation behavior and actual performance
of the team are interdependent. First, the practice of bonus and rating as-
signments provides incentives for performance in the subsequent period. Our
hypothesis is that, given the negative impact of reference point violation on
satisfaction, supervisors who push a larger share of their subordinates below
100% exhibit relatively lower performance ratings than other supervisors
in the subsequent year. To identify the reference point e⁄ect, we include
several variables DevRefit in some speci￿cations indicating how strong ref-
erence points of subordinates have been violated.
However, a possible negative e⁄ect found in regressions could possibly be
driven by the composition of teams. If a supervisor had only low-performing
subordinates in her team, she would be forced to assign low payout per-
centages and - given the correlation between her performance and team
performance - her rating should also be low. To distinguish between team
composition and incentive e⁄ects, we compare the results of ordered probit
models and linear models with ￿xed e⁄ects on the level of the supervisors.
While the ￿rst class of models enables us to identify mainly general sample
e⁄ects (team e⁄ects), the latter models give an insight how behavior of a
particular supervisor in￿ uences incentives to perform well in the subsequent
period. Table 4 lists models for Germany and the United States.
Model 1 serves as the benchmark for our analysis. In the ordered probit
speci￿cations, the share of assigned ratings have the expected signs: The
share of ￿ Excellent￿and ￿ Above Average￿managers in the team is positively
and signi￿cantly associated with the supervisor rating in the subsequent
year. Contrary, the share of ￿ Below Average￿managers a⁄ects performance
negatively (signi￿cantly so in case of the US). However, an important dif-
ference between countries is found if the e⁄ects of evaluation behavior are
analyzed on the supervisor level. While the assignment of the best possible
grade is positively related to supervisor performance in both countries, the
sign of ￿ Below Average￿ratings di⁄ers. In Germany, supervisor ratings are
10We include no dummy for the rating ￿ Inadequate￿ , because it is hardly ever assigned
in the data set.
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16higher, the higher the share of these managers is, indicating that di⁄erentia-
tion in ratings generally has a positive e⁄ect on incentives and ultimately on
performance. For the US, the opposite is true: the higher the share of man-
agers with a bad rating, the worse the performance rating of the respective
supervisor. This result possibly re￿ ects the above-mentioned ￿ stigma￿e⁄ect
of this rating. Assigning a ￿ Below Average￿may have a negative incentive
e⁄ect on the whole team.
Furthermore, the share of ￿ Above Average￿managers is negatively asso-
ciated with performance in Germany. The reason for this observation could
lie in the budgetary pressure associated with this rating. Supervisors with
a high share of positively rated managers are forced by the system to fund
their payouts by lowering payout percentages of the remaining managers in
their team. Hence, this result can be interpreted as a ￿rst indication for a
detrimental e⁄ect of violation of reference points. In the US, however, the
budgetary e⁄ect is weaker, as will be argued in the following.
Finally, compensation variables have signi￿cant positive e⁄ects in some
model speci￿cations, the most robust being the positive impact of salary
increases on the level of a supervisor in the US. Here, the data suggests the
functioning of ￿nancial incentives, as stronger salary increases are correlated
with higher performance in the subsequent year.
Given the e⁄ects of background variables, we analyze the implications
of reference points. Our hypothesis that violations are detrimental is sup-
ported in model 2, where we include the share of managers per supervisor
rated ￿ Average￿and receiving less than 100% bonus payout. Across coun-
tries we ￿nd results in line with the regressions on reported satisfaction.
Controlling for background, compensation data and evaluation behavior of
the supervisor, reference point violations negatively a⁄ect supervisor per-
formance in Germany. In speci￿cation 2, the control variable is negatively
associated with a supervisor·s performance. Thus, the more employees are
pushed below the reference point with their bonus payments in a given year,
the lower is estimated performance in the next year. This e⁄ect is robust
both in ordered probit models and on the level of particular supervisors.
There are two interpretations of this result: First, for a given team com-
position, good supervisors realize that one should take reference points into
account for the evaluation. Second, a given supervisor de-motivates her man-
agers when violating reference points. Furthermore, as in model 1, the share
17of ￿ Above Average￿managers is still negatively related to performance of a
given supervisor. Alternative speci￿cations of the model 2 with an inter-
action variable of the share of ￿ Above Average￿managers and the share
of ￿ average￿managers below 100% suggests that the negative e⁄ect of the
former is at least partly driven by budgetary pressure.
Contrary to the German models, we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant detrimental
e⁄ect of reference point violations in the US data. In model 2 (and also in
the other speci￿cations), the share of ￿ Average￿managers below 100% even
exhibits a positive sign. As managers do not orientate strongly on the ref-
erence point of 100% budget, performance is not negatively a⁄ected. Here,
supervisors can acheive a stronger variation in payouts avoiding negative
impacts of reference point violations. Moreover, the absence of the refer-
ence point even enables supervisors to allocate more high ratings to their
subordinates, because budgetary pressure is lower (in the US, some 11%
more of the managers receive ￿ Above Average￿than in Germany).11
In the following, we describe additional robustness checks to validate the
previous statements. The e⁄ects of reference point violations in Germany
(and the lack of an e⁄ect in the US) remain robust in alternative speci￿ca-
tions. Table 7 in the appendix lists models using further measures for team
composition and reference point violation.
First, we insert the mean and the coe¢ cient of variation of assigned
ratings instead of relative frequencies in the regressions (models 3). The
reference point e⁄ects remain equally signi￿cant in Germany, and overall
conclusions from evaluation behavior are similar to speci￿cation 1.
Second, we include mean payout percentages per supervisor for ￿ Aver-
age￿managers as an alternative measure for reference point violation (see
models 4). Also in this speci￿cation, the e⁄ect remains equally robust. The
respective coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant for Germany (both in the
ordered probit and the ￿xed e⁄ect model), indicating a stronger reduction
in payouts of ￿ Average￿managers decreases incentives accordingly.
Finally, our main result could be driven by ￿nancial constraints of the
supervisor rather than behavioral e⁄ects of reference point violation. There-
fore, we control for absolute bonus budgets per supervisor (models 5). The
11Please note that managers rated ￿ Average￿in the US receive about 3% less bonus pay-
out. Among supervisors who di⁄erentiate strongly in performance ratings, this di⁄erence
even increases to more than 7% on average.
18less budget per capita a supervisor is able to distribute, the more severe
would be budget e⁄ects, and the more managers would have to be reduced
below the threshold for a given performance rating distribution. However,
the inclusion of bonus budgets does not have a signi￿cant impacts for both
countries, and the e⁄ect of reference point violation remains signi￿cant for
Germany.
Summarizing, our data provides evidence that reference point violation
does not only a⁄ect employee perception but also has an impact on perfor-
mance. As in the case of satisfaction, our results highlight the impacts of
di⁄erences in system handling: Only where communication fosters orienta-
tion on reference points, detrimental e⁄ects of its violations are found. An
otherwise identical spread of payout percentages is not found to in￿ uence
performance if the reference point is not salient.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We have conducted an empirical study in which we connect demographic,
compensation and performance data with survey answers to derive insights
about the relevance of reference points for variable payment schemes. Com-
paring managerial employees in the United States and Germany, we ￿nd
e⁄ects consistent with loss aversion in the latter country. Negative payout
deviations from the reference point induced by the system signi￿cantly lower
reported job satisfaction, whereas positive deviations have little in￿ uence.
The absolute size of bonus payo⁄s does not have a signi￿cant impact on sat-
isfaction. Moreover, a violation of reference points in￿ uences performance,
as supervisor ratings drop with higher shares of managers being assigned a
bonus below their budget. In the US, system handling di⁄ers in a way that
prevents the formation of reference points, as personal payout percentages
are not explicitly communicated. Subsequently, the described detrimental
e⁄ects of reference point violations are not observed.
It is important to note that the exhibited patterns are not only in line
with loss aversion but also with theories of inequity aversion. In the present
bonus system, a reference point based on rational expectations and a so-
cial reference point coincide: First, 100% of the bonus budget is a natural
payout expectation for ￿ Average￿performance. At the same time, bonus
assignments also transmit information about the reference group. Receiving
19less than the budget, the manager knows that she has been rated lower and
received proportionally less than other managers. Thus, any bonus assign-
ment below the 100% threshold is equivalent to an inferior relative position
among managers rated by the same supervisor.
In general, our study provides evidence that social preferences are re-
￿ ected in employee satisfaction and also in performance. Because the e⁄ects
are partly related to the handling of the system, we can infer some practical
considerations for the design of variable payment schemes.
First, our data suggests that transparency of bonus payouts is a double-
edged sword. Economic theory does not provide clear predictions about the
optimal level of transparency within a given incentive system. Transparency
may help to foster traceability and also the acceptance of bonus payouts.
Yet, transparency can be detrimental if employees￿expectations are violated
and relative comparisons are triggered. Therefore, lower transparency might
mitigate relative comparisons. This is also in line with experimental ￿nd-
ings suggesting that a lack of transparency may dampen social comparison
e⁄ects (see Gehrig et al. (2007)). At the same time, however, low trans-
parency provides supervisors more degrees of freedom in the distribution of
payouts. In our sample, US supervisors are able to di⁄erentiate more in
bonus payments, because they do not have to orientate so strongly on ref-
erence points of their subordinates. Still, this leads to the undesired e⁄ects
of higher arbitrariness of bonus assignments, and, as budgetary pressure is
lower, performance ratings that are biased upwards.
The second and related point is how to di⁄erentiate in performance rat-
ings and payouts. In our sample, stronger di⁄erentiation in ratings on the
whole tends to have positive incentive e⁄ects. However, if reference points
play a role, further di⁄erentiation within a given rating is detrimental. Due
to behavioral patterns in line with loss aversion and inequity aversion, satis-
faction gains or higher incentives on the positive side of the reference point
are overcompensated by the losses in satisfaction and incentives on the neg-
ative side.
However, comparable studies with larger company data sets are neces-
sary to get a broader overview on the interaction of social preferences and
incentive system design. As empirical and experimental evidence clearly
shows that employees do not respond solely on material rewards, the goal
from a practical perspective is to design variable payment schemes that pro-
20vide an adequate balance between material incentives and non-monetary
preferences of employees.
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24Table 5: Determinants of Job Satisfaction among Employees rated ￿ Average￿
(Dependent Variable: Adjusted Satisfaction Level)
Country D US
No. 4 4
Model Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit
Fixed Salary (000s) 0.003 -0.004
[0.006] [0.004]
Salary Increase (000s) 0.005 0.002
[0.006] [0.025]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.049* 0.041
[0.028] [0.047]
Positive Deviation from Bonus -0.001 -0.009
Budget (=100%) [0.012] [0.010]
Negative Deviation from Bonus -0.024*** -0.006
Budget (=100%) [0.007] [0.006]
Observations 1544 574
log-likelihood -2364 -897
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance on the 10%, 5%
and 1%-level, respectively. Demographic Control Variables include a manager￿ s age and
gender, total years of a¢ liation to the company and at a given hierarchy level as well as
dummies for company divisions, hierarchy levels and promotions in the last year.
Control Variables of supervisor evaluation behavior include coe¢ cients of variation of
performance ratings and bonus payout percentages.
25Table 6: Determinants of Job Satisfaction (Dependent Variable: Adjusted
Satisfaction Level)
Country D US
Model OLS OLS
Fixed Salary (000s) 0.003 -0.004
[0.005] [0.003]
Salary Increase (000s) 0.003 -0.022
[0.005] [0.015]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.030 0.024
[0.020] [0.024]
Performance Rating 0.237 0.565**
￿ Excellent￿ [0.275] [0.268]
Performance Rating 0.140 0.284**
￿ Above Average￿ [0.113] [0.120]
Performance Rating -0.538* -1.591***
￿ Below Average￿ [0.309] [0.370]
Performance Rating -0.218
￿ Inadequate￿ [0.804]
Payout < 80% -0.608* 0.093
[0.363] [0.184]
80% ￿ Payout < 85% -0.478*** -0.314
[0.141] [0.262]
85% ￿ Payout < 90% -0.092 0.2
[0.126] [0.215]
90% ￿ Payout < 95% -0.204** -0.11
[0.084] [0.149]
95% ￿ Payout < 100% 0.000 -0.025
[0.064] [0.119]
105% ￿ Payout < 110% 0.045 -0.133
[0.087] [0.134]
Payout ￿ 110% 0.007 -0.076
[0.122] [0.148]
Constant -0.281 -0.185
[0.287] [0.313]
Observations 2093 917
R-squared 0.09 0.07
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance on the 10%, 5%
and 1%-level, respectively. Demographic Control Variables include a manager￿ s age and
gender, total years of a¢ liation to the company and at a given hierarchy level as well as
dummies for company divisions, hierarchy levels and promotions in the last year.
Control Variables of supervisor evaluation behavior include coe¢ cients of variation of
performance ratings and bonus payout percentages.
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